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ABSTRACT - This paper reports on the early stages of the 
development of a methodology to analyse and test autonomous 
systems in hazardous environments, with the aim of verifying 
both the safe decision-making and resulting actions of the 
system. The ultimate goal is to generate safety case evidence that 
a designer can provide to a regulator to show that the system to 
be used will likely operate safely. 
Keywords – UAV; Hazardous Environments; Verification; 
Simulation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There is currently a drive in the UK toward using 
autonomous systems, and robotic systems in particular, in 
extreme or hazardous environments [1]. This paper is 
concerned with the Verification and Validation (V&V) of 
autonomous systems operating in hazardous (specifically 
offshore) environments.  
Autonomous systems are systems which decide for 
themselves what to do [2]. Typically, these decisions are 
made using computer systems, which control the system in 
question and perform operations that might otherwise be 
performed by a person. For example, an autonomous 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) will need to contain a 
number of computer systems that can replace a human pilot 
operating the UAV using remote control [3].  
In this paper, an autonomous system means the following: 
A system that is given a goal and restrictions and 
fulfils this goal by planning, making decisions and 
carrying out actions without direct human 
interaction 
Robotic systems are good for tasks in hazardous 
environments. Typically, robotic systems are used for Dull, 
Dirty and/or Dangerous missions, commonly known as the 
“three D’s”. Recently however, the need to use robots within 
Demanding, Distant and Distributed missions has also been 
established. Offshore environments, such as oil platforms and 
wind farms, are prime examples of these latter “three D’s”.  
In all environments, but in particular for hazardous 
environments, autonomous systems must operate safely and 
be safe to operate. What is more, this must be demonstrable. 
Part of the process to demonstrate this safety case means that 
the decisions being made, by the system, the reasons why 
they have been made and the actions that result from these 
decisions need to be verified for all possible operating 
conditions. Furthermore, if a system fails, knowledge 
regarding why it fails is required. Thus, the question asked in 
this paper is as follows: 
How can an autonomous UAV be analysed to 
determine the conditions under which it fails and to 
indicate why it failed? 
This paper uses an example scenario of an UAV 
inspecting an offshore asset to demonstrate the development 
of tools and techniques that will be used to verify its safe 
operation. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section II establishes 
the challenges of offshore environments for autonomous 
systems; how V&V can be used to ensure safety; how a 
system needs to be constructed to be verified; how the V&V 
outputs can be used to build certification evidence; and how 
the methodology presented contributes to this. Section III 
presents the methodology to analyse the UAV and provide 
explainable failures and Section IV shows the results of its 
application and interpretation. Finally, conclusions are drawn 
and future work is detailed in Section V. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Offshore Operations  
For the purposes of this paper, ‘the offshore environment’ 
means the environment around energy generation assets, such 
as oil rigs and wind turbines. 
UAV operations, e.g., remote inspections around oil rigs 
and wind turbines, pose many engineering challenges. A 
potentially significant source of operational difficulty for 
such tasks will be when flying in the disturbed/turbulent air 
flow near such structures, as shown in Figure 1. Such 
turbulent flow structures make flying in and around the 
offshore assets dangerous if the vehicle does not possess 
sufficient control authority to maintain its desired position, 
leading to a potential collision with the asset or its associated 
personnel.  
A similar situation exists for ship-borne naval aviation 
operations. Helicopters are often operated from landing decks 
located at the ship’s stern. The ship’s motion and wind 
38Copyright (c) IARIA, 2019.     ISBN:  978-1-61208-712-2
ICAS 2019 : The Fifteenth International Conference on Autonomic and Autonomous Systems
 conditions create an area of disturbed air flow in the landing 
area. To determine whether a particular ship and helicopter 
combination is capable of landing/taking off from the ship 
under a given wind condition, flight trials are conducted to 
form a Ship Helicopter Operating Limit (SHOL) [4]. 
Previous work has investigated the replacement of part of the 
physical testing required to generate a SHOL with piloted 
simulations [4]. The method presented in this paper takes a 
similar simulation-based approach for autonomous UAV 
system missions.  
The scenario considered in this paper is an inspection task 
for a UAV on an oil rig leg. This is a sufficiently complex 
task to allow the methodology to be rigorously tested. It will 
be applied to other, more diverse scenarios at a later date. 
B. V&V of Autonomous Systems 
Autonomous systems present a significant challenge for 
V&V. Many non-autonomous systems are designed to use a 
human operator who has overall responsibility for the safe 
and reliable operation of the system. Autonomous systems, 
on the other hand, cannot assume the presence of the 
responsible human, and therefore must manage safe and 
reliable operations themselves [5]. 
 
Figure 1. A typical offshore UAV operating environment. 
 
V&V for autonomous systems uses many well-
established techniques, as well as some that have been 
developed with autonomous systems in mind [5]. At the same 
time, experimentation within controlled environments is a 
mainstay of engineering best-practice, and is also used for 
autonomous systems. However, due to the significant 
challenges and added complexity of autonomous systems, 
experimentation can be expensive and dangerous. Therefore, 
high-fidelity simulation is often used as a separate V&V 
technique [6]. High-fidelity simulation involves 
incorporating accurate physical models of a system within a 
realistic synthetic environment. Trials within high-fidelity 
simulation provide a safer and potentially cheaper means to 
test than physical experiments. Of course, this comes at the 
cost of needing to understand the limitations of the models 
being used. The models of the system and the environment 
used within simulation must themselves be verified and 
validated [7]. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. System Architecture of an Autonomous UAV with the separation 
of the component using layers which then indicates the verification method 
to be applied to each 
 
A V&V technique commonly used for autonomous 
systems is formal verification, an application of Formal 
Methods [8]. Formal verification works by building abstract 
mathematical models of the system in question, and then 
exhaustively analysing the models using software to 
determine whether or not particular requirements hold. 
Formal verification is particularly useful for finite state 
systems, and has therefore found a natural application in the 
verification and validation of autonomous software.  
There are, of course, many other V&V techniques not 
listed above, including hardware-in-loop testing [9], real-
world operations and end-user validation [10], that are also 
used for V&V of autonomous systems. 
C. Systems Architecture for V&V 
To be able to apply V&V to a whole system, it needs to 
be constructed in a certain way. This is mostly due to the 
models used to describe a sub-system. In Figure 2, the 
systems architecture of an autonomous system that is to fly 
UAVs around oil rigs is shown. There are two important 
features in this architecture: the layers and the intra-layer 
separation of subsystems.  
The layering is to group sub-systems, similar in 
construction rather than role or output. The calculation layer 
can be thought of as any task that reasons about the world in 
a non-abstract way, such as a route or mission planner. The 
decision layer is for those systems that make decisions based 
on information provided by the interaction and calculation 
layers. The interaction layer is the-low level autonomous 
tasks that translates plans and decisions into actions. The 
environment layer is the actual hardware that physically 
carries out the desired actions. 
On the right of Figure 2, the verification methods are 
aligned with the components that they are best suited to 
testing. Formal methods are well suited to analysing and 
verifying decision making, but the abstraction required to 
apply them to planners or continuous controllers makes them 
less so for these elements. Simulation-based testing allows 
39Copyright (c) IARIA, 2019.     ISBN:  978-1-61208-712-2
ICAS 2019 : The Fifteenth International Conference on Autonomic and Autonomous Systems
 many permutations of the systems goals, initial conditions 
and even internal parameters, to be tested; thus allowing the 
actions of the systems to be rigorously tested. The physical 
testing of the system then checks the results of the formal 
methods and simulations against reality and will determine 
the validity of the abstractions and assumptions required to 
build them. 
In short, with the system constructed in such a way, the 
following questions can be answered: 
Formal Methods - Has the safe decision been made? 
Simulation Based Testing - Did it result in safe actions? 
Physical Testing - How well do these answers match 
reality? 
D. Evidence for Safe Operations 
For an autonomous system to be used in a real-world 
environment, its safe operation needs to be agreed with the 
regulator. In the UK, there is no standard method for 
assessing whether or not autonomous UAV operations are 
safe. Each request for operation is reviewed on a case-by-case 
basis using a submitted safety case/risk assessment for the 
planned operation. 
V&V techniques can be used to generate evidence to 
prove that a system will operate safely and reliably. This 
paper proposes that formal methods and simulation based 
stress testing can be included to add strength to the safety 
case.  
For the scenario considered in this paper, the operating 
envelope of the system, when being used in certain conditions 
is the addition to the safety case. An example of this is shown 
in Figure 3. This example is intentionally similar to that of a 
SHOL. The aim of simulation-based verification is to 
generate this operating envelope.  The dotted lines represent 
the boundary between safe and unsafe operations.  
As an example, for a UAV doing inspections of the legs 
of an oil rig, there will exist a set of wind speeds and 
directions under which the UAV is no longer able to operate. 
The operator of the UAV, oil rig and regulators will need to 
know the safe wind speed and direction operating envelope 
before any task can proceed. 
 
Figure 3. Illustration of the safety case evidence aimed for when using the 
methodology. 
In addition, for this situation the variables that affect the 
safe operation of the UAV are not restricted to just the wind 
speed and direction. They could include, but are not limited 
to, the following: 
• Initial position and goal 
• Geometry of environment 
• UAV performance capability  
• Actuator/sensor performance/degradation 
• Other environmental conditions e.g. ambient light, 
sea state etc. 
This means that the real operating envelope will be a 
multi-dimensional surface. 
It is important to note here that such a surface can not only 
be used as safety-case evidence, but also as a run-time safety 
monitor. The analogy is that the boundary is the equivalent of 
the prior experience of the human pilot, where they intuitively 
know what actions and decisions are a good idea or not. This 
can then be used, while the system is in operation, to inform 
the autonomous system of when it is feasible to carry out a 
plan or not; or as a monitor to tell the system that, as the 
environment changes,  planned actions or current states (such 
as where it is) are no longer safe. 
E. Understanding the System’s Failure 
If a system is tested under one set of conditions and is 
found to successfully complete the task assigned to it safely, 
this is good. If under slightly different conditions, the system 
fails to complete it safely, this is also good. This now informs 
both the user and the system itself, when it should and should 
not carry out particular actions. This is the essence of the 
operating envelope shown in Figure 3. However, this does not 
inform the user, or regulator, why the system failed. 
It is far more useful to be able to say under what 
conditions a system can or cannot work and to also to be able 
to say why. This both directs any effort to redesign or 
improve the system, as the designer now knows which system 
to focus on; and it provides the regulator with a more concrete 
answer as to why it behaves in the way it does.  
As an example, suppose there are measures of failure for 
an actuator, controller, guidance, and navigation of a UAV 
(more on this in Section III). After a simulation of a task, at a 
number of wind speeds and directions, these failure measures 
are then applied to the response, a possible result could be as 
shown in Figure 4 (a). Outside of this boundary, the system 
failed its task, while inside it succeeded. The aggregate of 
these failure results in Figure 4 (b).    
This boundary is now the operating envelope of the 
system. However, by splitting the failure of the system into 
separate components, the colours shown can be added. This 
then indicates that the actuator, at least in this example, was 
the most likely cause of the system to fail its task.  
III. METHODS 
This section describes the cost functions and 
methodology used to apply V&V ideas to an autonomous 
systems.  
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 A. Cost functions for each component 
Four continuous autonomy components are considered. 
The responsibility of each component, what its job is, 
determines the definition of the cost function. The 
responsibilities of each component are as follows: 
Actuator: To create the required output while leaving a 
margin of error as a contingency. 
Controller: To force the current states to follow the 
commanded states as closely as possible, while 
maintaining system stability. 
Guidance: To cause the system to follow the desired 
path to within a desired separation distance. 
Navigation: To generate a path between the start and 
goal, while avoiding collisions with objects. 
The cost function defining the actuator’s performance is 
shown in (1) and illustrated in Figure 5. 
 𝐴𝑓 =
1
𝑛𝑎
∑
1
𝑡𝑚
∫
√(𝐴𝑖 − .5)2
. 5 − 𝑀𝑎𝑟
𝑑𝑡
𝑡𝑚
0
𝑖=𝑛𝑎
1
 (1) 
Where 𝑛𝑎 is the number of actuators, 𝑡𝑚 is the maximum 
simulation time, 𝐴𝑖 the actuator output at time 𝑡, 𝑀𝑎𝑟 the 
specified margin of error, and 𝑑𝑡 the time step of the 
simulation. 
Here, the zero point for the actuator is 50%. The function 
is, in essence, a time average of the deviation from the neutral 
point normalised by the margin of error. The performance of 
all the actuators is averaged over time and over the number 
of actuators.  
This function aims to create a single measure for all the 
actuators over the time period of operation between 0 and 1. 
The cost function gives a gradual increase in the failure. If an 
actuator reaches either 100% or 0%, this results in the failure 
of the system being set to 1. This can be considered a critical 
failure, as would a collision, since the system would very 
likely become unsafe.  
The controller’s performance is defined in (2) and shown 
in Figure 6.  
 𝐶𝑓 =
1
𝑛𝑠
∑
1
𝑡𝑚
∫
√(𝑅𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖)2
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑖
𝑑𝑡
𝑡𝑚
0
𝑖=𝑛𝑠
𝑖=0
 (2) 
Where 𝑛𝑠 is the number of controlled states, 𝑅𝑖 is the 
command reference, 𝑢𝑖 the measured state of the system, and 
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑖  the specified max difference between the actual and 
reference values. 
It is essentially the same as the cost function used in 
Linear Quadratic Regulator controllers. The difference 
between the reference and controlled state is normalised by a 
desired maximum distance. It is then averaged over both time 
and the number of controlled states. A discontinuity exists 
when the system becomes unstable.  
The guidance performance is defined by both in (3) and 
Figure 7. 
 𝐺𝑓 =
1
𝑡𝑚
∫
√(𝛿𝑥 + 𝛿𝑦 + 𝛿𝑧)
2
𝐷𝑖𝑣
𝑑𝑡
𝑡𝑚
0
 (3) 
Where 𝛿𝑥, 𝛿𝑦, and 𝛿𝑧 are the orthogonal difference 
between the actual position and the desired path and 𝐷𝑖𝑣 is 
the specified maximum deviation from the path. 
It is the length of the vector perpendicular to the nearest 
point on the desired path from the system’s current location. 
It is then normalised by the desired maximum deviation from 
the path. A discontinuity does not explicitly exist with this 
function, however the discontinuities are handled by the 
mission manager’s performance, see Criteria Analysis 
section later. 
The navigation’s performance is defined by (4) and by 
Figure 8.  
 𝑁𝑓 =
1
𝑡𝑚
∫
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥
𝑃
𝑡𝑚
0
𝑑𝑡 (4) 
Where 𝑃𝑛 is the planned proximity at the point on the path 
perpendicular to the current position, 𝑃 the proximity to the 
nearest object, and 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥 is the specified maximum proximity 
to an object.  
Figure 4. Illustration of how the subsystems can be combined and therefore allow the explanation of why a system failed to operate safely
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Figure 5. Definition of cost function for the analysis of the actuator’s 
performance 
 
Figure 6. Definition of cost function for the analysis of the controller's 
performance 
 
Figure 7. Definition of the cost function for the analysis of the guidance 
performance 
 
 
Figure 8. Definition of the cost function for the analysis of the navigation 
performance 
B. Simulation Environment 
A simple simulation environment of a helicopter moving 
around the legs of an oil rig is used to generate the data 
required to test the above cost functions, see Figure 9.  
It consists of a series of linearized state space flight 
dynamics models identified from a non-linear simulation 
model. The models are then scheduled based on the forward 
flight speed of the UAV, to account for the changing 
dynamics.  
To control the helicopter a PI controller [11] is gain 
scheduled and a waypoint following with cross tracking error 
is used as the guidance method [12]. A simple A* route 
finding algorithms is used for the navigation [13], where a 
simple hazard model is used to allow the planner to plan a 
route around the wakes of the oil rig legs. 
A sample data set is taken from the simulation 
environment and presented in the next section. The cost 
functions are then applied to the output of the simulator. 
 
Figure 9. Systems diagram for the simulator 
IV. RESULTS 
When testing and analysing an autonomous system’s 
performance, a designer may be presented with the output 
shown in Figure 10 to Figure 12. From this the designer 
would be able to determine whether the UAV was able to 
carry out the task assigned to it. In this case, simply move 
from bottom left to the right of the top right leg. 
However, some of the routes come very close to the legs, 
to the point where a collision is very likely. This is also for 
only a single set of conditions, but can only be interpreted 
visually. If the conditions change, will the UAV be able to 
still carry out the task? How does this compare to other UAVs 
or settings/weightings within the autonomous components of 
the UAV? 
A closer inspection of the least risky plan’s response of 
the UAV can be seen in Figure 13, Figure 14, and Figure 15. 
From this, it can be determined that the control input is not 
exceeded, the body velocities follow the reference values and 
the UAV follows the desired path reasonably well. However, 
again this does not allow an easy comparison to other UAVs 
or settings. The interpretation is also abstract and not 
quantified. 
Further detail can be determined from Figure 16 and 
Figure 17, where how well the UAV followed the planned 
path and how well the plan enabled the UAV to avoid 
collisions with its surroundings is shown. The actuator cost 
function can be applied to the results in Figure 13, the 
controller function to Figure 14, the guidance function to 
Figure 16 and the navigation function to Figure 17. 
42Copyright (c) IARIA, 2019.     ISBN:  978-1-61208-712-2
ICAS 2019 : The Fifteenth International Conference on Autonomic and Autonomous Systems
  
Figure 10. Balance between a route's total distance and the risk associated 
with it 
 
Figure 11. Planned routes for a range of risk weightings 
 
Figure 12. Plan view of the response of the UAV as the guidance, 
controller and model tries to follow the planned route 
 
This allows a simple metric to be applied to the UAV’s 
response, reducing the interpretation of the performance 
down to a single number, thus allowing easier comparisons 
and optimisations of the UAV’s settings to be made. 
Figure 18 to Figure 21 show the cost functions of the 
UAV response for a range of different performance 
specifications.  
Figure 18 shows that, as the specification is made more 
demanding, the cost increases, as would be expected. It also 
illustrates the control that is closest to failure, in this case the 
collective.   
Figure 19 shows the performance of the flight controller. 
It can be seen that the u and v velocities are by far the most 
difficult for the controller to follow; also that unless very 
strict limits on the deviation of the actual from the command 
reference values are imposed, the performance is good. A 
similar story can be seen in Figure 20, where only very small 
allowed deviations from the desired direction will result in 
the system’s failure. 
Figure 20 shows that, on average, the guidance system 
allows the UAV to follow the desired path well. Only when 
the allowable deviation from the desired path is below 4 ft 
will the system fail. Therefore, showing that the guidance is 
able to perform correctly, unless under tight restrictions. 
The navigation performance is shown in Figure 21, where 
the performance decreases as the closest allowable proximity 
of the UAV to an object is increased. It can be seen that only 
small allowable proximities result in the system being safe. 
Taking Figure 18 to Figure 21 together, it can be seen that 
the actuators and controller are performing well, even under 
tight requirements. Guidance performs well, but the 
navigation component is the likely cause of the systems to be 
unable to carry out its assigned task. This is in contrast to the 
interpretation of Figure 10 to Figure 12, where such 
conclusions are harder to draw, as the performance of the 
system is not quantified. 
 
Figure 13. Control inputs for the UAV 
 
 
Figure 14. Body velocities (u,v,w)/heading (psi) and controller reference 
velocities (uR, vR, wR, psiR) 
43Copyright (c) IARIA, 2019.     ISBN:  978-1-61208-712-2
ICAS 2019 : The Fifteenth International Conference on Autonomic and Autonomous Systems
  
 
Figure 15. UAV (x, y, z) and reference (xref, yref, zref) positions 
 
 
Figure 16. Plan view of the UAVs response when following the least risky 
planned route. Solid line = planned route. Dashed line = path taken 
 
 
Figure 17. Actual and planned proximity to the nearest object at a point in 
time in the UAV's response 
 
 
Figure 18. Performance metric for the actuator when applied to the UAV's 
response for a range of specifications 
 
 
Figure 19. Controller performance for the body velocities for a range of 
specifications 
 
 
Figure 20. Controller performance for the direction command reference 
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Figure 21. Navigation performance for a range of specified proximity 
specifications 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
A. Conclusion 
A method for the analysis of the continuous autonomous 
components of a system has been reported. Results from a 
scenario where a UAV moves around an oil rig’s legs have 
been presented. 
The need to certify an autonomous systems operating in 
hazardous environments by V&V methods was discussed and 
the need to separate the failure of subsystems outlined. 
It was found that by applying the presented methodology, 
the performance of the system can be quantified; also, that 
the component that is likely to cause the system to fail can be 
found, and therefore focused on by the system’s designer. 
Thus, the first stages of a method to analyse a system to 
determine when a system fails and why was successfully 
demonstrated. 
B. Future Work 
Having a quantifiable metric of a systems performance 
allows two follow up pieces of work. First, it allows the 
generation of operating envelopes, which can then be used by 
a systems user or by the system itself as safety run time errors. 
Second, it allows the performance of the system to be 
optimised by wrapping the simulation and analyse method in 
an optimiser, where the bias, weightings and settings of the 
system are the independent variables and the outputs of the 
presented cost functions can be used to form a cost function 
of an optimiser. 
To achieve both of these, a third and final follow up task 
is required, where an algorithm to search all the variables that 
can influence the system’s performance is needed. The 
algorithm will be required to move through both continuous 
and discrete parameter space. A hybrid evolutionary/genetic 
algorithm or a modified Particle Swarm Optimisation method 
is a likely solution to meet this requirement. 
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